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through repairs to the family automobile. 19 None of the earlier
jurisprudence explains why vicarious responsibility has barred
an action in the same fashion as contributory negligence. The
instant opinion gives an interpretation of article 2318 which is
completely sound.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
"Actions for Damages .

.

. Suffered by the Husband"

The Digest of 1808 did not contain any specific provision on
the separate or community character of damages recovered by
either spouse for personal injuries. Presumably during the life
of that Digest, and consistently with the Spanish law of which
it was a digest, recoveries for personal injuries to either spouse
belonged to that spouse as separate assets. The Civil Code of
1825, however, introduced an "omnibus clause" into what is now
article 2334 of the current Civil Code, providing that "[c]ommon
property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife during marriage, in any manner different from that above declared
[to be separate property]." Under this clause, the judiciary
came to declare that amounts recovered for personal injuries
to either of the spouses entered the community of gains. Act 68
of 1902 amended article 2402 to read in part that "damages resulting from personal injuries to the wife . . . shall always be
...separate property of the wife." Then Act 170 of 1912 amended
article 2334 to read in part that "actions for damages resulting
from offenses and quasi-offenses [to the wife] ... are [the wife's]
separate property." Finally Act 186 of 1920 further amended
article 2334 in part to provide that "[a]ctions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi-offenses suffered by the husband,
living separate and apart from his wife, by reason of fault on
her part, sufficient for separation or divorce shall be his separate
property." From this time on, certainly there could be no doubt
that actions for damages for personal injuries to the wife occurring during the existence of the community of gains form part
of her separate patrimony, whereas similar actions for personal
injuries suffered by the husband during the community of gains
are common assets unless he has suffered the injuries while liv19. This holding was

accomplished

in

footnote

3 of

the

opinion by

expressly overruling Funderburk. 257 La. 567, 574, 243 So.2d 259,.261 (1971).
. Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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ing separate and apart from his wife under circumstances entitling him to separation or divorce from her by reason of her
fault. Already by 1920, then, Louisiana law gave preferential
treatment to the wife over the husband far beyond the dreams
of the proponents of "women's lib."
It was only in 1965, however, that any question was raised
concerning the application of the above-mentioned legislation
in instances in which the husband's injury occurred during the
existence of the community regime, but the recovery thereon
made after its termination and at least in part for the effects of
the injury continuing beyond that time. In that year the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal decided, in Tally v. Employer's Mutual
Liability Insurance Co.,1 that damages awarded to the husband
for such pain and suffering and medical expenses as occurred
after the termination of the regime by separation from bed and
board belonged to him alone. Review was refused, the supreme
court finding "the results are correct." 2 Then in 1970 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal, in Alfred v. Alfred,8 not only followed
the lead in Tally, but decided that all damages recovered by the
husband after the dissolution of the community of gains should
belong to him alone. Judge Miller dissented on the ground that
articles 2402 and 2334 could not support the "equitable" result,
and later joined Judge Hood in dissenting from a refusal of the
court to grant a rehearing in the case. Almost simultaneously,
4
the First Circuit Court of Appeal, in Chambers v. Chambers,
adhered more closely to the reasoning in Tally to decide that
the wife was not entitled to participate in that portion of an
amount received in a compromise which pertained to effects of
the injury "accruing after the dissolution of the community
regime."
The supreme court reviewed the Chambers decision in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. Justice Hamiter, writing for
the majority, declared:
"We agree with the Court of Appeal that [the wife] is
not entitled to participate in that portion of the [funds
recovered in a compromise on the amount of the damages
1.
2.
3.
4.

181
248
237
238

So.2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
La. 785, 181 So.2d 783 (1966).
So.2d 94 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
So.2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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without prejudice to the determination of their proper distribution] that compensate [the husband] for damages accruing after the dissolution of the community regime." 5
After saying this, nevertheless, Justice Hamiter's opinion goes
on to find that, on the basis of the condition of the record and
other circumstances of the case "[i]t will be virtually impossible to reconstruct exactly how much weight was given by the
negotiators to each of the items with respect to future pain and
suffering and loss of wages," and on this basis decided that the
wife should receive half of the total amount recovered by the
husband. Justice Sanders concurred in the decree, but not in
the majority's reasoning, emphasizing that under the legislation
the cause of action itself is a community asset and citing the
present writer's remarks on Tally in 27 Louisiana Law Review
at pages 456-457. Justice Dixon also concurred in the result, he
too emphasizing that the cause of action itself was a community
asset under the Civil Code's articles. Justice Tate rendered a
masterful and passionate dissent, in which Justice Barham concurred. He not only noted the husband's entitlement to have
the judiciary apply the law as construed by the majority to
the facts of his case, as difficult as that might be under the circumstances, but observed that the absolute language of articles
2334 and 2402 need not be taken as having been intended to apply
in cases such as Chambers. Quite correctly, in the writer's opinion, Justice Tate argued that the Chambers facts presented a
case not covered by express law and therefore that the judiciary
should proceed under article 21 of the Civil Code to decide
"equitably," that is to say, in accordance with natural justice
and right reason. But this was not the end of the matter.
On application for rehearing, the court rendered a per curiam
opinion, adopting in essence the reasons given by Justices Sanders
and Dixon in their dissents and by Judge Miller in his dissent in
Tally, stating that the majority had intended to say just that in
the first instance. Justice Summers dissented stating that "the
time of the husband's injury determines whether the award for
injury is community or separate property," but that such sums
as are awarded for such items as earnings or pain and suffering
calculated to accrue after termination of the community regime
should belong to the husband alone. In the writer's opinion,
5. 259 La. 246, -,

249 So.2d 896, 903 (1971).
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Justice Summers' dissent is internally inconsistent. Justices
Tate and Barham dissented from the per curiam opinion emphasizing that it did not represent the views of the majority of the
court.
Having already stated his agreement with Justice Tate's
dissent in Chambers, the writer hardly need add that the strict
application of the words and implications of articles 2402 and
2334 to circumstances of the kind dealt with in Tally, Alfred,
and Chambers could not have been intended by a thoughtful
legislature. Circumstances such as these, therefore, as Justice
Tate remarked, should be considered outside the coverage of
those articles. It is therefore with the utmost remorse that the
writer is conscious of the fact that his own remarks on Tally, in
27 Louisiana Law Review at pages 456-457, seem to have contributed to Justice Sanders' formation of his opinion on the case,
and possibly to Justice Dixon's formation of his and to Judge
Miller's view in Tally. The writer's specific words were:
"Granted that the legislation is guilty of unequal justice
to husband and wife in this matter of damages for delicts,
it nevertheless must be asked by what authority any sums
[recovered by the husband for personal injuries occurring
during the community regime] can be considered the separate assets of the husband."6
The writer cannot believe that he was ever of the opinion those
words express and would like to believe his original manuscript
would show additional remarks along the lines of those in Justice Tate's dissenting opinion; but that manuscript was destroyed
long ago, and the writer must accept blame for having failed in
this case to give proper guidance to the legal community.
Legislation on the subject is in order. The writer recommends that all recoveries in indemnification of personal injuries
as such be declared the separate assets of the person injured and
that recoveries for losses of wages and for medical and other
expenses after the date of the dissolution of the regime should
be declared the separate assets of the injured spouse. The new
legislation should provide also that, in the event of the dissolution of the community of gains after the receipt of damages
awarded in compensation for loss of future earnings or for future
medical and similar expenses, there should be withheld from the
6. 27 LA. L. REV. 456-57 (1967).

1972]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1970-1971

223

wife's share of the community assets such amounts as can be
deemed to represent one-half of the injury-caused expenses not
yet incurred and one-half of so much of the amount originally
awarded for loss of earnings as may be determined to have been
given for the period beyond the date of the dissolution of the
regime; otherwise the wife would be enriched without cause
at the expense of the husband.
Obligations Incurred by the Wife
Decisions continue to confuse the laws relating to (1) the
married woman's capacity to obligate herself, (2) her power to
obligate her husband, and (3) her power under matrimonial
regime law, or, more specifically, the community of gains.
The capacity of a married woman to obligate herself is a
matter of the law of persons, and more particularly of the law
of marriage. If the married woman is under eighteen or interdicted, she has only the capacity of an emancipated minor 7 and,
in addition, being under her husband's authority, she requires
his concurrence or consent to obligate herself in any matter
other than the administration of her paraphernalia 8 or the purchase of necessaries for herself and family in instances in which
he has failed to supply themY If over eighteen and not interdicted, she has full capacity to obligate herself personally in any
matter whatsoever.' No matter what her age, however, she lacks
the power (legal right rather than capacity) to obligate her husband by her voluntary act except as his mandatary" or as his
negotiorum gestor.12 And, accordingly, the husband alone having the legal right or power to incur obligations by voluntary
act which will enter the community between the spouses, 13 no
voluntarily incurred obligation of the wife, though it pertains
to the community of gains between the spouses, may enter that
community unless she has acted as his mandatary or his gestor.
Moreover, although the husband may ratify the unauthorized
act of the wife entered into in representationof him, he may not
ratify any act entered into by her as principal; in the latter
7. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 379-384.

8. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2384, 2390, 2393, 2394, 2436.
9. LA. Cv. CODE art. 1786.
10. LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1787.
12. LA. CYv. CODE arts. 2295, 2299.
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404.
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instance he may only assume the wife's obligation under the
same conditions that he might assume any other person's obligation.
Examined in the light of the above exposition, the decision
in Credit Service Corp. v. Dickson 14 is open to question. A wife
living separate and apart from her husband contracted for medical services without consulting her husband, or, it is assumed,
even notifying him of her need. The court decided the husband
was liable to the assignees of the persons with whom the wife
had contracted for these services on the grounds (1) that under
Civil Code article 120 the husband owes the wife support and
(2) that under Civil Code article 2403 "the debts contracted
during the marriage enter into the . . . community of gains."
For additional support of its conclusion the court relied on a
previous decision declaring (3) that, "so far as the general public
is concerned, the wife has implied authority" to obligate her
husband for medical services unless circumstances indicate otherwise. 5 None of these reasons can support the conclusion that
in a case such as this the husband is obliged directly to the suppliers of medical services or their assignees. Civil Code article
120 purports to do no more than establish an obligation from
husband to wife; it does not pretend to create an obligation of
the husband toward third persons. Moreover, under matrimonial
regime law, which applies only between husband and wife, the
wife is obliged for that portion of the cost of the medical attention to her or to her husband (as an expense of the marriage)
which corresponds to the ratio of her separate income to her husband's income. 16 Again, as detailed above, the husband is never
obligated because the "community" is obligated; but rather an
obligation enters the community of gains only by the husband
being obligated and the subject matter of the obligation being
one of common concern. Besides, the existence or non-existence
of a community of gains has nothing to do with the question
14. 243 So.2d 827 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
15. Overton v. Nordyke, 10 La. App. 317, 120 So. 544 (Orl. Cir. 1929).
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2389 which, construed against arts. 2395 and 2435,
(applicable to instances in which the spouses are separate in property by

contract or judgment) must be taken to mean that, there being a community
of gains between the spouses, if the wife does not bring a dowry and if she
has any separate income, she must bear a share of the expenses of the mar-

riage corresponding to the ratio of her income to her husband's, but not
more than one-half her income in any case. Although the article mentions
only income from paraphernal

assets, and not income from

earnings, it

must be recalled that it was written long before 1912, when the earnings of
the wife living separate and apart were first declared her separate assets.
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of the husband's liability toward third persons for obligations
contracted by the wife. The community of gains, being a contract between the spouses, can have direct effects only between
them. The husband's direct liability toward those with whom
the wife contracted, then, can exist only if she has acted as his
mandatary or as his gestor in an appropriate case. It is true that
the wife living with her husband can be said to have, by custom
consistent with law, a tacit mandate from her husband to contract in his name for day-to-day expenses of the marriage, including ordinary medical services, unless he has revoked that
mandate; but this mandate cannot reasonably be presumed when
the spouses are living separate and apart. 17 Finally, it cannot
be said that the third party with whom the wife acts as the
husband's negotiorum gestor acquires a direct right against the
husband unless the wife has acted in his name. Under Civil Code
article 2295 the principal is obligated to the third party only if
the gestor has acted in the principal's name; if the gestor has
acted in his or her own name, though for the benefit of the principal, it is only the gestor, and not the third party, who acquires a
direct right against the principal.' 8 The gestor's creditor then
should be able to exercise the obligor's (the gestor's) right
against the principal, 19 but only subject to whatever limitations
it might have. At best, therefore, the assignees of the wife's
creditors for medical services should have been allowed to recover from the husband only that portion of the fees and charges
which corresponded to the husband's proportionate obligation
to contribute to expenses of the marriage according to the formula given in article 2389 of the Civil Code.
Language in a second decision holding the husband liable
for obligations contracted in the name of the wife also may be
criticized under the observations made at the initiation of this
section and on other grounds. In Royal Furniture Co. v. Benton,20
17. PLANIOL, TRAITt ELEMENTAIRE DIDDROIT CIVIL [FRANgAIS] III (11th ed. 1937)
no. 1462 bis, holds the same opinion for French law.
18. LA. Civ. CODE art.

2299.

19. A DIGEST OF THE CIviL LAws Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS
3.3.66 (1808), which expressly gave creditors the right to exercise their

debtors' rights, was deleted from the Civil Code of 1825 (and not reinserted
in the Civil Code of 1870); but the comments of the redactors at page 263
of the Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 (reprinted in LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES)
indicate that the deletion of the article was not intended to abrogate the

rule itself, but only to remove the article from an inappropriate section of
the Civil Code.
20. 242 So.2d 69 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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the wife had used her name only in purchasing furniture. Part
of the opinion of the majority reads as follows:
"Purchases made and debts contracted during the existence of the community are, as a general rule, presumed to
be for the benefit of the community. Articles 2402 and 2403,
Civil Code. The husband can repudiate the transactions
entered into by his wife, but if he is aware of them and takes
no action to set them aside, he is deemed to have ratified
them. [Case citations.] Article 1817, Civil Code.
"We hold that in cases ... in which the wife was acting
for the community . . . the husband as head and master of
-21
the community is a proper party defendant ....

The first observation must be on the incorrectness of the general
judicial practice, of which this decision is only a specimen, of
treating the community of gains as a legal entity with which
third persons may have direct legal relationships, and of which
the husband is the chief but not sole representative, but for
which he is full surety. On the contrary, the community is not
a legal entity, but only a convention between husband and wife
which, like other conventions, can give rise to direct legal effects
only between the spouses as parties. Third persons cannot know
or have legal relations with the community of gains as such;
they can have legal relations only with the husband or wife as
persons. Creditors of the husband may enforce payment out of
his patrimony which, while the community is in existence, includes both his separate assets and the community assets; and
creditors of the wife may enforce payment out of her patrimony,
which includes only her separate assets. Thus the wife never
may be said to "act for the community." She may act in representation of her husband, with his consent or as his gestor, but
then she obligates him personally, and not the community of
gains as such.
The writer is well aware that the views above expressed
are inconsistent with many decisions 22 and also with the impli21. Id. at 71. Judge Landry dissented, but only on a question of negotiable instruments law of no relevance to this discussion.
22. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227,
210 So. 2d 328 (1968), so ably demonstrated to be inconsistent with the proper
understanding of the Legislation in a student note by George Bilbe (now
Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University) 29 LA. L. REV. 409 (1969).
See also the writer's comments in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
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cations of some legislation of recent years if taken very literally; 23 but in the writer's opinion such inaccuracies of language result from past failures to understand the structure
of the institution, rather than from the desire to alter it, and
should be construed accordingly.
The second observation to be made on the above-quoted language from Benton is that it exaggerates the limits of the tacit
mandate from husband to wife presumed by custom consistent
with law. It is one thing to say there is a custom to the effect
that the husband may be presumed to have authorized his wife
to act as his representative in incurring ordinary family expenses, or expenses of the marriage, as mentioned before. But
it is another to say that "as a general rule" the acts of the wife
will be presumed to have been authorized by the husband unless
he takes action to "repudiate" them. Under such language even
acts intended by the wife to obligate herself alone might be
deemed to have consequences for the husband if he did not "repudiate" the transactions timely. It may be observed that it is
not unusual for married women to make acquisitions or enter
into other transactions intending to have sole benefit of the
effects of those transactions and to obligate themselves alone.
The general language of Benton, therefore, would give uncalledfor advantage to creditors of the wife against her husband, and
often would transform an advantage sought by a married woman
for herself alone into one for the husband as well. It should not
be forgotten that in Louisiana the community of gains is only
part of the total marriage regime. Each spouse remains separate
in property as to assets and liabilities existing at marriage or acquired or incurred during marriage, either by the use of separate
funds or by succession or donation. No doubt the excesses of the
judiciary in decisions like that in Benton at times may have been
inspired by an economy oriented toward creditor security; but the
legislation does not provide a base for such decisions and the
writer, for one, doubts that the substance of the words used in
Benton can be said to have such popular approbation as to warrant a finding that a custom to that effect exists.
Court for the 1968-1969 Term-Matrimon&al Regimes, 30 LA. L. REV. 219-21
(1969).
23. See, e.g., the amendment to LA. Civ. CODE art. 1787 by La. Acts 1944,
No. 49; LA. CODE CiM. P. arts. 686 and 735.
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Partition on Dissolution
Lester v. Lester 24 is to be noted as a decision very correctly
recognizing that, on the termination of the community of gains
by separation from bed and board, the wife accepting the community simply may demand an immediate partition regardless
of what debts the spouses may have. This, indeed, is exactly
what articles 2406-2409 of the Civil Code state; and, moreover,
if the Civil Code is construed correctly, not even the wife's
acceptance with benefit of inventory may operate to deny to
her or the husband the right to an immediate partition regardless of debts. Any other constructions would be inconsistent
with article 1047 of the Civil Code, made applicable by R.S.
9:2821 to the wife's acceptance of her share of the community of
gains with benefit of inventory.
It is regrettable, however, that the opinion in Lester does
not demonstrate the correctness of its conclusion on the basis
of the legislation. Indeed, the only discussion of legislation in
Lester is the denial, correct in itself, that article 2403 of the
Civil Code implies the necessity of a "liquidation" of the community simply because it specifies that separate debts are to
be paid with separate funds and community debts with community funds. That article does no more than state a rule of
accounting between the spouses. 25 The misunderstandings on
this point and many others in the law of the community of
gains can be traced to the tendency to regard the community
as an "entity" with its own rights and obligations rather than
as a purely contractual arrangement between the spouses. The
error of this "entity" concept, however, has been alluded to in
the previous section and has been demonstrated quite convincingly in a recent student comment.26 The demonstration need
not be repeated here.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
A considerable number of cases decided by the appellate
courts during the 1970-71 term dealt with sales, leases, and other
24. 245 So.2d 478 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
25. See Bilbe, Note, 29 LA. L. REv. 409 (1969).

26. LeBlanc, Comment, 30 LA. L. REv. 603 (1970).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

